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VIEWPOINT
Fixing Philanthropy: A Vision for Charitable Giving and Reform
by Roger Colinvaux
Philanthropy means to give for the benefit of 
others. Unfortunately for philanthropy and civil 
society, the laws supporting philanthropy are in a 
state of crisis. More by happenstance than design, 
the law now caters overwhelmingly to the whims 
of wealthy donors to the detriment of those in 
need. We find ourselves with a legal framework 
ostensibly designed to promote broad-based 
philanthropic activity, but which is better 
described as a framework where the wealthiest 
get tax benefits that are unavailable to others; 
claim those (sometimes questionable) benefits 
while retaining effective control over donated 
funds; and use the system to advance their policy 
preferences, avoid scrutiny, and undermine the 
centuries-old faith and trust that our nation’s 
charities represent the public good. Although the 
trends are dire, Congress can take steps to 
broaden the base for charitable giving, improve 
the flow of money to working charities, 
strengthen oversight, and restore credibility to 
philanthropy.
Two Sides to Philanthropy
Meaningful philanthropy has two key aspects: 
a voluntary sacrifice (or gift) and a worthy cause. 
If someone is compelled to make a payment to 
support even the noblest of causes, the payment is 
not a gift and would not be philanthropic. 
Likewise, gifts in support of a terrorist 
organization, even if voluntary, would fail as 
philanthropy because the cause falls outside 
mainstream ideas of what is worthy of support.
Federal law has long recognized and provided 
support for both these aspects of philanthropy. On 
the giving side, for over 100 years, the charitable 
deduction has encouraged giving by reducing its 
cost. If a dollar given to charity costs the donor 
only 63 cents (the current maximum subsidy), 
donors can afford to and will give more. On the 
worthy cause side, federal law defines a charity as 
being for specific purposes (for example, 
charitable, educational, religious, and scientific), 
and limits some types of activities (for example, 
no political campaigning). The rules are meant to 
define the outer boundaries of a worthy cause and 
ensure that charitable dollars are used for public 
good and not mainly to benefit donors or other 
private interests. Both planks of federal support 
for philanthropy, however, are at a breaking point.
A Broken Giving Incentive
Consider first the charitable deduction. 
Although it is widely credited with encouraging 
giving, it has also been criticized as a tax break for 
the wealthy that serves the policy preferences of 
vested interests through their control of the purse 
strings.1 This criticism recently has taken on 
startling new force. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
sliced by more than half the number of people 
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1
Several recent books relay this theme. See Rob Reich, Just Giving: 
Why Philanthropy Is Failing Democracy and How It Can Do Better (2018) 
(discussing the ways in which philanthropy is a plutocratic voice); 
Anand Giridharadas, Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the 
World (2018) (describing philanthropy as “elite led, market-friendly, 
winner-safe social change”); and David Callahan, The Givers: Money, 
Power, and Philanthropy in a New Gilded Age (2018) (discussing the power 
wielded by wealthy philanthropists).
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who will claim the deduction (an astonishing 21 
million fewer people).2 Thus, we have gone from a 
country where roughly 20 percent of taxpayers 
participated in the giving incentive to one where 
just the top 9 percent of taxpayers will receive a 
tax break for their gifts.3
Setting aside the effect this change will have 
on giving totals (one estimate puts the loss at $17.2 
billion),4 even more important is the impact a 
shrunken base of participation will have on the 
future of philanthropy. By providing a giving 
incentive for just the wealthiest, the policy signal 
is that the values of the charitable deduction — 
altruism, pluralism, civic participation — should 
be rewarded only when undertaken by the 
wealthy.5 It is ironic (and even insulting) that the 
federal government pays for more than one-third 
of the cost of gifts by the wealthiest 9 percent of 
taxpayers; but gifts by everyone else receive no 
subsidy. This disparity will solidify the giving 
incentive as just another tax planning tool for the 
elite and erode the pluralistic values that make 
our civil society a national asset.
The ultimate strength of the charitable 
incentive is in fostering diversity in the charitable 
sector through a wide range of individual 
support. The broader the base of that support, the 
more diverse, pluralistic, and independent the 
sector becomes. By shrinking the base of the 
charitable deduction to the top 9 percent (plus 
corporations!),6 the philanthropy that emerges 
will strongly reflect the philanthropic preferences 
of this elite group, meaning a nonprofit sector 
created by the better off in society, for their causes. 
Philanthropy will increasingly become a self-
serving vanity project for one segment of society, 
and less worthy in a true philanthropic sense.
A Charitable Giving Credit
The solution is a giving incentive for all 
taxpayers. Legislation has been introduced in 
Congress that would provide a so-called 
universal deduction. The basic idea is simple and 
correct: Let everyone claim a charitable giving 
incentive. But in its current form the idea is more 
rhetorical than real. An unlimited, universal 
giving incentive would cost billions in taxpayer 
dollars, a very hard sell given that budget deficits 
are already closing in on $1 trillion.
Further, an unlimited incentive would be 
wasteful and inefficient. A tax incentive should 
not reward all giving, much of which will occur 
regardless of tax breaks. A sensible approach 
would be to reward gifts exceeding a minimum 
amount (a floor) — this would encourage the 
extra giving that might not otherwise occur and 
reduce the revenue and administrative costs of an 
expanded incentive. In short, an incentive for all 
taxpayers triggered by a minimum amount of 
giving could increase giving, broaden the base of 
participation, and need not cost the sun and the 
moon.
But charitable giving policy should not stop 
there. Simply to open the existing door wider is to 
ignore festering problems inside that should be 
fixed. One issue that has long dogged the 
charitable deduction is that it provides different 
rewards based on income level, with the wealthier 
getting more. Under the deduction, if a taxpayer 
makes a $1,000 gift, the amount of the tax break 
varies widely. The subsidy could be $370, $320, 
$220, $120, or $0, depending on which tax bracket 
the taxpayer is in and whether the taxpayer 
itemizes deductions. This is unfair. Further, the 
amount of the tax break changes as tax rates 
change, making giving more expensive when 
rates go down and cheaper when rates go up, 
regardless of the amount that would generate the 
most giving. Rather than this inequitable, ad hoc 
system, it would make more sense to provide a 
uniform benefit, say 25 percent of the gift. A fixed 
amount would be fairer and more transparent to 
taxpayers, which in turn could result in greater 
giving at less cost.
This could be accomplished by replacing the 
deduction with a credit. A tax credit for the 
charitable giving of all taxpayers, subject to a 
floor, would be a bold step toward fairness, 
2
Joseph Rosenberg and C. Eugene Steuerle, “Reforming Charitable 
Tax Incentives: Assessing Evidence and Policy Options,” Tax Policy 




Alex Brill and Derrick Choe, “Charitable Giving and the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act,” American Enterprise Institute (June 2018).
5
See Roger Colinvaux, “The Importance of a Participatory Charitable 
Giving Incentive,” Tax Notes, Jan. 30, 2017, p. 605.
6
Christopher Ingraham, “Massive New Study Traces How 
Corporations Use Charitable Donations to Tilt Regulations in Their 
Favor,” The Washington Post, Jan. 17, 2019.
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transparency, and efficiency. It would unleash 
charitable giving to reflect the interests of the 
American people, not simply those with the most 
resources.
To address concerns that a floor might wipe 
out the incentive for many middle-income 
donors, there could be different floors depending 
on income level. For example, for high-income 
taxpayers, a floor as a percentage of the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income (say 2 percent) might make 
sense. For lower-income taxpayers, a lower 
percentage or even a dollar-based floor should be 
considered.7 The objective would be to set the 
floor at an amount that would be transparent and 
not so high as to reward only extraordinary giving 
levels.
Reform In-Kind Giving
Another important if less well-known issue 
lawmakers should address is in-kind giving (that 
is, gifts of property). In-kind giving is a billion-
dollar industry. In 2015, for example, in-kind 
contributions were about $64 billion, or nearly 
one-third of the amount of all contributions.8 
Indeed, some charities are set up substantially to 
solicit and then sell property contributions and 
distribute the proceeds.9 Right now, taxpayers can 
give almost anything to charity (interests in a 
private company, jewelry, a stuffed game trophy, 
or cryptocurrency, for example) and receive a 
deduction for the full appraised value, even if the 
value later plunges, the charity incurs significant 
costs to maintain or sell the property, or the 
charity does not want the property but accepts it 
to avoid antagonizing a donor (or even to 
facilitate tax abuse). Unfortunately, many 
property gifts cheat the government because the 
deduction is based on the appraised value (which 
may have to be litigated), not the amount made 
available after sale. Further, the deduction for in-
kind giving is an extra boon for the wealthy 
because the law permits donors to deduct 
untaxed appreciation and avoid capital gains 
tax.10
Assuming that policymakers are not ready to 
limit the charitable giving incentive to cash gifts 
only11 or to limit the ability to deduct untaxed 
gains,12 another option would be to better align the 
giving incentive with the public benefit provided 
by the gift. Instead of basing the tax benefit on the 
appraised value of donated property, the benefit 
should be based on the amount made available 
after sale.13 Doing so would at least make certain 
that scarce taxpayer dollars are not being used to 
subsidize gifts of questionable value and that the 
subsidy matches the net amount that working 
charities receive.14
Making Philanthropy Work for Philanthropy
Fixing the charitable giving incentive to make 
it fairer, more widely available, and less prone to 
abuse would be a huge improvement, but that 
would address only part of the problem facing 
philanthropy.
The other part is that the boundaries that have 
long been designed to keep excessive private 
influence out of the charitable sphere are under 
constant strain and attack. The combination of 
open-ended legal standards, weak enforcement, 
partisan pressure, and the rise of new giving 
vehicles have all contributed to a weakening of 
the “worthy cause” side of philanthropy. The 
philanthropic scale is becoming tilted in favor of 
donors and private interests, to the detriment of 
the causes that philanthropy is meant to serve.
7
A dollar-based floor or floors (for example, only gifts exceeding 
$500 get the benefit) would be transparent to taxpayers, who would 
know at the start of each year exactly when the incentive would begin.
8
IRS, “Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions, Tax Year 2015.”
9
Fidelity Charitable, for example, in 2015 reported receiving $2.95 
billion in noncash contributions. See generally David Gelles, “How Tech 
Billionaires Hack Their Taxes With a Philanthropic Loophole,” The New 
York Times, Aug. 3, 2018 (discussing ways that donors use donor-advised 
funds (DAFs) for in-kind property contributions).
10
See Calvin H. Johnson, “Ain’t Charity: Disallowing Deductions for 
Kept Resources,” Tax Notes, Aug. 2, 2010, p. 545.
11
For additional discussion, see Colinvaux, “Charitable 
Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined,” 50 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 263 (2013).
12
See Colinvaux, “Donor Advised Funds: Charitable Spending 
Vehicles for 21st Century Philanthropy,” 92 Wash. Law Rev. 39 (2017) 
(arguing that if the deduction for in-kind giving is retained, the tax 
benefit be limited to the lesser of the net benefit to charity from the gift or 
the donor’s tax basis plus one-half of the untaxed appreciation).
13
This is the approach that applies to car donations. See section 
170(f)(12).
14
If noncash gifts are allowed as part of any expansion of the giving 
incentive, it is natural to expect the many problems associated with in-
kind giving to multiply, making the need for reform even more pressing. 
One approach might be to keep the current itemized deduction largely 
intact (but with a new floor) while allowing a non-itemizer, cash-only 
credit — subject to a floor (or floors). Such an approach would, however, 
retain the inequity of current law by providing greater benefits to 
wealthier donors.
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Limit Donor Control and Improve Transparency
The problems here are so varied that a neat 
summary is impossible. To start, however, one 
critical area for common-sense solutions reflects 
the phenomenal rise of a new giving vehicle — the 
donor-advised fund (DAF). DAFs are financial 
accounts managed by a sponsor (like Fidelity 
Charitable, Schwab Charitable, or Vanguard 
Charitable). A donor contributes to the sponsor 
(in cash or property) and takes a tax deduction, 
and the sponsor opens an account in the donor’s 
name. The donor then decides when to distribute 
money from the account to a charity. Money in 
DAFs can remain there indefinitely because there 
is no requirement that DAF contributions be spent 
at any specific time. DAFs resemble charitable 
checking accounts — the donor gets the tax 
benefit immediately but writes the check later, if 
ever.
DAFs matter because they now dominate 
charitable fundraising, representing roughly 10 
percent of gifts. In 2017 Fidelity Charitable was 
the No. 1 charity in the United States, raising $6.83 
billion, more than twice as much as the United 
Way.15 Altogether, the top four DAF sponsors 
raised more in 2017 than the top 10 working 
charities — that is, active groups like the Salvation 
Army — combined.16 In short, billions of dollars 
are going to conduit charities each year, waiting to 
be put to use at the donor’s say-so, but after the 
donor has already taken a tax deduction. Notably, 
recent tax law changes will help ensure that 
DAFs’ share of the giving pie will continue to 
grow because donors now have incentives to 
bunch several years of contributions into one year 
to get a deduction for their gifts.17
Although the DAF structure is legal, at bottom 
DAFs give donors too much power to decide 
when to make distributions. The payout rate — or 
the rate of spending from DAF accounts — is 
often touted as a sign of health in the DAF 
industry. This is because aggregate payout rates 
are high when compared with private 
foundations. The National Philanthropic Trust, 
for example, reports a payout rate for 2017 of 22.1 
percent across all DAFs, with a similar rate for 
prior years.18 There is, however, no agreed method 
for determining payout rate. If the denominator of 
the payout ratio is changed from prior year asset 
value (which the National Philanthropic Trust 
uses) to payout year asset value plus grants 
(which reflects current year contributions) the 
payout rate for 2017 drops substantially from 22.1 
percent to 14.9 percent.
Further, one major limitation in the data is that 
it is collected on an aggregate basis, not an 
account basis, meaning that all payout 
calculations are averages. So even if a DAF 
sponsor boasts a payout rate of 20 percent, this 
could mean that for every one DAF account that 
pays out all contributions in the year of the 
contribution (a 100 percent payout rate) there are 
four DAF accounts that pay nothing. In other 
words, average payout rates reflect a wide array 
of high and low payout rates per fund. One 
researcher, for example, estimates that in 2012, 
over a quarter of DAF organizations had roughly 
a 4 percent payout rate with “466 organizations 
that reported no grants paid out at all.”19
Also, there are built-in constraints that can 
deter spending the money invested in DAF 
accounts. When DAF sponsors (or affiliated 
entities) earn fees based on amounts under 
management,20 they have a financial incentive to 
retain funds. When this is combined with the 
human tendency to procrastinate on tough 
decisions and to save for the future, there is 
reason to be concerned that the institutional 
default of the DAF industry is toward 
accumulating, not spending.21 Moreover, even 
when money goes out of a DAF relatively quickly 
15





As discussed above, the increase in the standard deduction means 
that many taxpayers will not ordinarily spend enough in a given year to 
get a tax benefit for charitable gifts. As a response, many taxpayers are 
likely to defer their giving and bunch many years’ worth of gifts together 
into one year to exceed the standard deduction and obtain a tax benefit.
18
See National Philanthropic Trust, 2018 Donor Advised Fund Report 
18.
19
Paul Arnsberger, “Donor-Advised Funds: An Overview Using IRS 
Data,” Boston College Law School Forum on Philanthropy and the 
Public Good (Oct. 2015).
20
See Alan M. Cantor, “Donor-Advised Funds and the Shifting 
Charitable Landscape: Why Congress Must Respond,” 134-136 
(unpublished manuscript).
21
See James Andreoni, “Who Benefits From Donor Advised Funds? 
Insights From Behavioral Economics,” University of California, San 
Diego working paper (May 2016) (discussing the endowment and other 
effects from behavioral economics as giving “the donor the incentive to 
wait before spending the money from the DAF”).
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(say within four years of the initial contribution), 
there is a social cost to the delay because that 
money cannot be put to active use. The longer that 
money sits unused in a DAF, the longer that 
urgent needs of working charities and those they 
serve go unmet.
The purpose of these accounts is, or should be, 
to raise and promptly distribute money for 
charity, not to become foundations of wealth for 
future generations to spend.22 And yet DAFs are 
becoming a form of institutionalized deferral of 
charitable activity without any input or 
discussion from Congress as to their appropriate 
role. Congress should carefully consider whether 
DAFs are serving the public interest and the 
philanthropic sector as a whole. Are charities and 
their beneficiaries better off from having 
enormous sums of money pass through a 
financial intermediary? Do DAFs actually 
increase charitable giving in substantial enough 
amounts to justify their costs?23 At a minimum, 
Congress should weigh whether to impose a 
requirement that all DAF contributions be put to 
use within a reasonable time, say five to seven 
years.24 A reasonable spending rule would not 
disrupt the ease of giving and convenience of 
DAFs, and working charities would have a 
reliable and steady influx of needed cash, from all 
DAFs.25
There is also a darker side to DAFs. The very 
flow-through nature of a DAF means that it can be 
used to launder money and avoid transparency in 
charitable giving.26 A focus here are private 
foundations, which typically are set up by 
wealthy founders or families. Because of the 
inherent possibilities for abuse through family 
control of the foundation, Congress 50 years ago 
established a separate legal regime for 
foundations to ensure that the assets are used for 
public good. For example, foundations must 
publicly disclose their major donors so the public 
can trace foundation funds. But if a foundation 
pays to a DAF, and then advises a payment from 
the DAF, disclosure and accountability are 
avoided. Thus, if a right- or left-leaning 
foundation wants to back a cause without telling 
people, it can hide behind a DAF intermediary.27
Relatedly, foundations can also use a DAF to 
avoid their legal obligation to spend a minimum 
amount on charity each year. Foundations 
commonly make grants to DAFs,28 which 
technically counts as spending, even though the 
foundation retains advisory privileges and does 
not ever have to distribute the money from the 
DAF. Foundation-to-DAF grants are yet another 
way that money can remain under effective 
control of the donor without getting to working 
charities.
There is an easy fix to these loopholes. Private 
foundations either should not be allowed to count 
distributions to DAFs as spending, or must spend 
any such distributions quickly and, in any event, 
with full flow-through disclosure.
22
See Drummond Pike, “How I Helped Create the Donor-Advised 
Fund Monster — Inadvertently,” Chron. of Phil. (Aug. 22, 2018) 
(describing how DAFs are essentially “mini-private foundations”).
23
See Andreoni, “The Benefits and Costs of Donor-Advised Funds” in 
32 Tax Policy and the Economy (2018) (arguing that to be cost-effective, 
DAFs should in the aggregate generate in the range of 16 to 30 percent of 
new charitable giving, but there is “little evidence that DAFs are 
encouraging significantly more giving over a policy of no DAFs”). 
Andreoni points out that a main use of DAFs is to avoid capital gains tax 
on appreciated assets, which can cost new revenue loss without any new 
charitable giving. For example, with DAFs, a donor has a strong tax 
incentive to give appreciated property instead of cash to wash out the 
capital gain and use the cash to repurchase the asset.
24
See, e.g., Chuck Collins, Helen Flanner, and Josh Hoxie, “Report: 
Warehousing Wealth: Donor Advised Charity Funds Sequestering 
Billions in the Face of Growing Inequality,” Inst. Pol’y Studies (July 25, 
2018); and Ray Madoff, “Three Simple Steps to Protect Charities and 
American Taxpayers From the Rise of Donor-Advised Funds,” Nonprofit 
Q. (July 25, 2018).
25
Not all DAF sponsors are the same. The largest have commercially 
affiliated sponsors (such as Fidelity, Schwab, and Vanguard). Others are 
housed within community foundations or operating charities (such as a 
university). One issue for Congress to address is the extent to which the 
type of DAF sponsor is relevant in determining any spending rule. See 
Colinvaux, “Defending Place-Based Philanthropy by Defining the 
Community Foundation,” 2018 BYU L. Rev. 1 (2018) (discussing the 
extent to which community foundations are distinguishable from 
commercial DAF sponsors).
26
Alana Semuels, “The ‘Black Hole’ That Sucks Up Silicon Valley’s 
Money,” The Atlantic, May 14, 2018.
27
See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the 
Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right 205-207 (2016) (describing 
private foundations’ use of DAFs to fund a policy campaign against 
climate science); and Robert O’Harrow Jr., “Project Veritas Received $1.7 
Million Last Year From Charity Associated With the Koch Brothers,” The 
Washington Post, Dec. 2, 2017 (describing the Koch Foundation’s use of a 
DAF).
28
See Mark Harris, “How Elon Musk’s Secretive Foundation Hands 
Out His Billions,” The Guardian, Jan. 23, 2019 (describing a $37.8 million 
gift from the Musk Foundation to Vanguard Charitable in a year when 
the foundation’s payout was high); “A Philanthropic Boom: ‘Donor-
Advised Funds,’” The Economist, Mar. 23, 2017 (noting that in a random 
sample of foundations, some gave more than 90 percent of their money 
to DAFs).
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Problems of Enforcement and Administration
So far, the problems discussed that plague the 
charitable sector are concrete enough to allow for 
fairly straightforward solutions, assuming there is 
political will to act. More difficult to tackle are 
problems of enforcement and administration. 
There are more than 1.3 million charities, with 
tens of thousands of new ones formed every year 
(nearly 80,000 in 2017).29 To address a backlog in 
applications for charitable status, the IRS in 2014 
introduced a short form application, the Form 
1023-EZ, which has so streamlined the process 
that small new charities can easily form with little 
understanding of their legal obligations, and bad 
actors can just as easily use the short form to game 
the system.30 Further, there are hundreds of 
thousands of other nonprofits, which include 
social welfare groups like the NRA, the ACLU, 
and AARP. The division of the IRS charged with 
oversight has seen its budget slashed and has 
been under attack for more than five years for its 
bungled attempt at overseeing the political 
activity of nonprofit groups.31 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the audit rate for charities is 
infinitesimally low. The IRS reports that tax-
exempt organizations filed 1,528,487 returns in 
2017 (including the Form 990 series and other 
returns) and that of these, about 3,678 were 
audited, for an audit rate of 0.24 percent, or one-
quarter of 1 percent.32
And even if the IRS was looking, legal 
violations are not always clear and are easy to 
disguise. Here is an archetype of possible abuse. 
A wealthy individual sets up a “charity,” and 
funds the group with tax-deductible 
contributions (perhaps even from the founder’s 
DAF to get around being classified as a private 
foundation). The founder sits on the board and 
hires his son to be CEO, paying him handsome 
compensation, for which the son “manages” the 
money. If the founder is politically motivated, the 
charity might grant charitable funds to a dark 
money group, ostensibly for “social welfare” 
purposes, that uses the money to intervene in 
political campaigns. The charity might also hold 
and manage private business interests of the 
founder (for which the founder took a deduction), 
make loans to family members that are never paid 
back, or contract with the founder’s company. If 
these scenes sound familiar, it is because one or 
another variant of them has been featured in 
unfavorable news reports about charities.
A well-publicized recent illustration involves 
a charity called Foundation for Accountability 
and Civic Trust (FACT). FACT employed 
Matthew Whitaker before his appointment as 
acting attorney general. FACT’s stated mission is 
to work for accountability and ethics in 
government. Public filings show that from its 
founding in 2014 through 2017, FACT received 
virtually all of its funding from Donors Trust, a 
section 501(c)(3) organization and a sponsor of 
DAFs. If the donations had come directly from 
one individual instead of through a DAF, FACT 
would have been classified as a private 
foundation and subject to tougher rules. Overall, 
donations from Donors Trust were $3,450,000, of 
which $1,219,000 was paid to Whitaker as salary 
(for 39 months’ work). The rest was paid to a 
handful of private entities, one of which had the 
mission of defeating Democrats.33 Importantly, 
this apparent misuse of section 501(c)(3) can be by 
actors on the political right or left.34
Some of the problems of private benefit and 
influence over charities are endemic to the system. 
The law has always allowed charities to form 
29
For example, the IRS reports that in 2017, 79,699 new charities 
(section 501(c)(3) organizations) were approved while 68 were 
disapproved. IRS, Table 24a, “Closures of Applications for Tax-Exempt 
Status, by Organization Type and Internal Revenue Code Section, Fiscal 
Year 2017.”
30
The Taxpayer Advocate Service lists this new form as one of the 
most serious problems in tax administration. See TAS, “Annual Report to 
Congress 2017, Most Serious Problems Encountered by Taxpayers, 
Exempt Organizations: Form 1023-EZ, Adopted to Reduce Form 1023 
Processing Times, Increasingly Results in Tax Exempt Status for 
Unqualified Organizations, While Form 1023 Processing Times 
Increase,” vol. 1, at 64 (2017).
31
See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, “In Targeting Political Groups, I.R.S. 
Crossed Party Lines,” The New York Times, Oct. 5, 2017.
32
This number is not exact because the returns filed include one form 
(Form 8872) not reflected in the audit figure and the audit figure 
includes two forms (forms 1041-A and 1120-POL) not reflected in the 
return figure. See IRS, “Returns Filed, Taxes Collected & Refunds 
Issued,” at Table 2, “Number of Returns and Other Forms Filed, by Type, 
Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017”; and IRS, “Enforcement: Examinations,” at 
Table 13, “Returns of Tax-Exempt Organizations, Employee Retirement 
Plans, Government Entities, and Tax-Exempt Bonds Examined, by Type 
of Return, Fiscal Year 2017.”
33
See O’Harrow, Shawn Boburg, and Aaron C. Davis, “Conservative 
Nonprofit With Obscure Roots and Undisclosed Funders Paid Matthew 
Whitaker $1.2 Million,” The Washington Post, Nov. 20, 2018.
34
Treasury is considering rules to address the use of DAFs to avoid 
private foundation treatment. See Notice 2017-73, 2017-51 IRB 562.
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based on their purposes, which can be very broad. 
Keeping the criteria for worthy causes broad 
helps to ensure pluralism within the sector and 
avoids the IRS having to make politically charged 
and substantive determinations of what is in the 
public interest. But a porous border also means 
that bad actors can abuse the charitable form, and 
that groups that are more about propaganda than 
education — and business rather than charity — 
can operate under a charitable guise.35
While there is no easy answer, Congress can 
do some things that could help. One is to leave 
alone the rule that prohibits charities from getting 
involved in political campaigns. To allow the 
repeal or weakening of this rule (lately called the 
Johnson Amendment) would be devastating to 
the independence of the sector from partisan 
money flows.36 Part of what makes philanthropy 
work is our collective belief that on balance, 
charitable organizations are not self-serving or 
partisan. If charities are allowed to campaign in 
elections, this basic belief will be shattered, and 
we will all be worse off.
Some strongly believe that endorsing 
candidates in elections is central to the mission of 
some charities, particularly evangelical churches. 
This may be a sincerely held view, but it should 
not dictate the norms of the entire charitable 
sector. If possible, Congress should try to find a 
way to accommodate the concerns of this 
minority of charitable organizations, without 
adopting a rule that undermines the integrity of 
the charitable sector or that further involves the 
IRS in regulating campaign activity, as last year’s 
(and now this year’s) proposed legislation would 
have done.37
Congress could also take steps to improve 
enforcement outcomes. One simple and cost-
effective measure would be to require the 
electronic filing of the information returns (Form 
990s) that charities and other nonprofits must file. 
Electronic filing would enhance oversight of the 
sector because this public information would 
become available on a more timely basis and 
would be much easier to access and administer — 
by the public, the news media, and the IRS.38
Further, Congress could show support for the 
oversight function of the IRS regarding 
nonprofits, with more funding and less partisan 
posturing. Political support from the taxwriting 
committees in Congress would help IRS efforts to 
protect charitable assets from private corruption 
and deter bad actors. And if Congress is unwilling 
to be a constructive partner in the enforcement 
challenges the IRS faces, it should convene a panel 
to study whether oversight responsibilities 
should be taken out of the IRS altogether. The IRS 
is primarily a revenue collection agency, not a 
nonprofit regulator.39 This means that when it 
comes to tax-exempt organizations, the IRS has 
few incentives to enforce the law and significant 
challenges in doing so, which as recent history has 
shown can lead to a national political firestorm.40
Better Legislation
Congress also needs to get smart. In the TCJA, 
Congress cited the importance of a robust 
charitable sector, but at the same time passed 
provisions that seem wrong, overbroad, or not 
thought through (or all three), and that add 
indescribably high compliance costs to groups 
that are unequipped to cope (nor should they 
have to).
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The leading example is a tax on nonprofits for 
providing free parking to employees.41 Congress 
said the tax would “make the tax system simpler 
and fairer for all businesses.”42 The fairness 
rationale presumably comes from the fact that 
elsewhere in the act, Congress removed the 
deduction that for-profit businesses get for 
providing free parking. But “fair” or equal 
treatment between a nonprofit when performing 
its nonprofit functions and a for-profit business 
makes no sense. There is not meant to be a level 
playing field, which is why nonprofits get tax 
exemptions in the first place.43 The result is that 
now every nonprofit (including churches, which 
have been vocal in their opposition) that provides 
free or discounted parking to employees must 
determine the cost of the parking and perhaps file 
a tax return for the first time.44 This provision is a 
mistake and should be promptly repealed before 
any more time is wasted by nonprofits and the IRS 
in implementation.
A slightly less egregious example of poor 
legislating relates to the unrelated business 
income tax, which is a tax on the for-profit 
activities of nonprofits (a true “leveling the 
playing field” tax). Ironically, here, Congress has 
now adopted a rule that treats nonprofits worse 
than for-profit businesses.45 For-profits generally 
may aggregate income and expenses across 
different trades or businesses. Until the TCJA, 
nonprofits were treated similarly regarding their 
unrelated business income. But now the code says 
that nonprofits must calculate the net income or 
loss from each business separately (called siloing) 
and may not measure their aggregate business 
income or loss. Not only is this an unfair way to 
measure income, but it treats nonprofits worse 
than for-profits, which runs against the level 
playing field rationale Congress seemed to care 
about in other provisions. Further, the new 
approach is incredibly complicated because 
nonprofits now must determine how to classify 
distinct trades or businesses, which no one knows 
how to do.46
The reasoning for the new UBIT approach has 
its roots in a 2013 IRS study.47 This study, however, 
pertained to only one segment of the nonprofit 
sector — an audit sample of 34 colleges and 
universities. Yet the siloing provision applies not 
only to every section 501(c)(3) organization (not 
just colleges and universities), but also to all other 
nonprofits, including social welfare groups, labor 
unions, and trade associations. More importantly, 
the main problem that the IRS identified in the 
study was the improper allocation of expenses 
and losses from nonprofit business to for-profit 
businesses, which was already prohibited 
(resulting in the IRS adjusting the income of the 
audited group). In short, the new siloing 
approach is a vastly overbroad remedy to an issue 
of unknown scope that imposes highly significant 
compliance costs on the nonprofit sector. 
Congress should repeal this and return to the 
drawing board.
Setting aside the wisdom of the parking tax 
and the UBIT siloing rule, the broader point is that 
increasing the compliance burden on nonprofits 
and charging the IRS with enforcement of unclear 
provisions is not the best use of nonprofit or 
government resources.48 These provisions were 
rushed through, and perhaps the need to repeal 
them can serve as an opportunity for serious 
consideration of issues that do need legislative 
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Time to Act
The charitable sector is at the edge of crisis. 
Fortunately, there are steps Congress can take: 
strengthen the giving incentive by making it 
available to more people within sensible limits; 
eliminate waste in the deduction for in-kind 
contributions; unlock the money available for 
distribution to working charities with a 
reasonable spending rule for DAF contributions; 
and improve transparency and foster more 
spending from private foundations by limiting 
foundation-to-DAF transfers. Congress can also 
strengthen the worthiness of the charitable sector 
by retaining the historic separation of politics 
from charity; mandating the electronic filing of 
information returns; providing adequate funding 
for oversight; and revisiting the rushed-through 
ideas in the TCJA.
The approaches outlined here will not solve 
all the problems, and other ideas should be 
explored, but it is critically important that 
policymakers and stakeholders in the nonprofit 
sector look beyond their own interests and 
commit to take steps to improve both the giving 
and worthy cause sides of philanthropy.
A healthy and vibrant charitable sector is in 
the national interest and should be an area where 
common-sense solutions can be reached. Perhaps 
in the 116th Congress, our leaders will come 
together and take the steps necessary to make 
philanthropy work, for all Americans. 
